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The aim of this paper is to investigate the existence of a spatial
dependence of crime rates at a local level in the case of municipalities
of Minas Gerais, one of the 26 Brazilian states. Results suggest the
existence of a positive spatial autocorrelation of municipal violent crime
rates. However, it also appears that violent crime against property and
against persons do not follow the same spatial behavior. While violent
economic crime seems to spread a lot, interpersonal violence is a much
more localized phenomenon.
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11 Introduction
In Minas Gerais, in 2000, violent crime rate ranged from 0 in some rural
municipalities to 1244 per 100 000 inhabitants in the capital, Belo Horizonte.
Carneiro (2000) reports that some areas in the suburbs of Rio de Janeiro and
São Paulo experience homicide rates comparable as those experienced by a
country in war.
The question of the spatial location of criminals has for a long time in-
terested social scientists. Blau and Blau (1982) study crime rates in Amer-
ican metropolitan regions and explain higher rates in urban areas by the
diﬀerence in social structure. More recently, Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999)
used a decomposition analysis to explain why there are more crime in cities,
concluding in the existence of scale economies for crime. At a theoretical
level, spatial location of crime has been associated with the existence of lo-
cal interactions between criminals, making their localization not random (see
Sah 1991, Glaeser et al. 1996).
There is also a large literature on the empirics of spatial location of
crime, reviewed by Anselin et al. (2000), with a particular focus on the
process of spatial diﬀusion of homicide (for example Cohen and Tita 1999,
Messner et al. 1999, Baller et al. 2001, Messner and Anselin forthcoming).
These works suggest a strong evidence of clustering of homicide around crime
centers, emphasizing the emergence of homicide “hot spots”. However, these
works focus only on homicide and do not provide any evidence concerning
the spatial diﬀusion of violent crime against property.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the existence of a spatial de-
2pendence of municipal crime rates in Minas Gerais, one of the 26 Brazilian
states. By using spatial econometric techniques of testing and estimations,
we explore the amount and structure of spatial diﬀusion of crime among a
cross-section of 723 municipalities of Minas Gerais in 2000. The intuition is
that it may exist a kind of geographical criminal inertia, already emphasized
theoretically by Sah (1991). Moreover, the database allows a decomposition
between violent crime against property and against persons, which enables
to see if these two kinds of crime follow the same spatial process or not.
The choice of working at the municipal level has been motivated by the
fact that it seems to be the most appropriated in the current context of se-
curity policy in Brazil. The national plan of public safety proposed by the
new Brazilian government plans to give more prerogatives to municipalities,
like formulating safety plans and creating municipal polices (see Secretaria
Nacional da Segurança Publica 2003). Moreover, the new Country Assis-
tance Strategy report of the World Bank for Brazil recalls that “experience
in Latin America and elsewhere suggests that the municipal level is one of
the most eﬀective entry points for crime and violence prevention”1.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy reviews recent
works dealing with social interactions and their connection with crime at
a micro-level, and discusses the link between local interactions and spatial
autocorrelation. Section 3 presents the database and preliminary tests of
spatial autocorrelation among violent crime rates. Results of regressions
using a spatial estimator are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
1World Bank (2003), p. 9.
32 Conceptual framework
Introducing a spatial variable in crime regressions comes from both the-
oretical motivations, mainly linked to the concept of social interactions, and
from econometric requirements, not taking spatial aspect of crime into ac-
count involving biased results.
The concept of social interactions has been renewed during the 1990’s,
essentially in the ﬁeld of urban economics, in an attempt, as it is recalled by
Akerlof (1997), to go beyond the traditional model of individual behavior.
The underlying hypothesis is the fact that individuals do not make their
choices independently, their decisions are also the consequences of their so-
cial environment (family, friends, neighbors, ethnic and/or religious group,
etc.). In other words, these social interactions can lead individuals to a col-
lective behavior, even without formal coordination: individual decisions and
social environment are now endogenous. According to Borjas (1995) and
Akerlof (1997), social interactions increase with social proximity, essentially
due to ethnicity and/or neighborhood. Durlauf (1994) and Borjas (1995)
also consider intergenerational transmission of human capital and income
stratiﬁcation. Social interactions are then considered as a vector of diﬀusion
of values and knowledge.
This process of diﬀusion is also present in the explanation of crime. Co-
hen and Tita (1999) consider two types of crime diﬀusion. The ﬁrst one,
contagious diﬀusion refers to the process of disease spreading and underlies
a direct contact between the ﬁrst criminal and his followers (the building of
gangs typically follows this process). Contagion itself follows two schemes.
4Relocation diﬀusion suggests that criminals move from a point to another,
the ﬁrst one not being a crime center anymore. On the opposite, in the case
of expansion diﬀusion, both former crime center and new crime place expe-
rience violence. The second kind of crime diﬀusion is hierarchical. Unlike
contagion, it does not underlies direct contact between criminals but rather
the existence of spontaneous innovation or imitation.
Theoretically, Sah (1991) considers a model where individual’s decision to
commit a crime depends on his perceived probability of punishment (which
is endogenous) but not on the actual probability. The perceived probabil-
ity depends on the individual’s environment and particularly on the actual
probability of punishment of other criminals. In other words, since the num-
ber of arrests by the police is limited, the more the criminals, the less the
(perceived and actual) probability of punishment. This work inspired the
one of Glaeser et al. (1996) who explain the high crime variance across time
and space by diﬀerences in social interactions. They ﬁnd that, for United
States, the role played by diﬀerences in social interactions in the explana-
tion of diﬀerences in crime rates is high for delinquency (such as larceny,
theft, car theft), moderate for serious crime (such as robbery, burglary and
assault) and small for murder and rape. This result suggests that “learning
by seeing” is relevant concerning economic crime but not for interpersonal
violence, which is rather conform to intuition.
However, does controlling for spatial autocorrelation in crime rates re-
gressions means measuring the role of social interactions? Anselin et al.
(2000) recall that one must be careful with the interpretation of spatial de-
pendence because the scale where crime data are collected (such as states,
5regions, counties or municipalities) is almost arbitrary and does not reﬂect
the “true” scale of crime (which is individual). Hence, there can be artiﬁcial
spatial dependence in a variable, due to an inadequate spatial scale. This
also requires a speciﬁc econometric treatment but such an estimate does not
have any economic sense.
Moreover, even in the case where spatial dependence across crime rates
corresponds to a “true” spatial process involving the presence of social inter-
actions among criminals at micro-level, controlling for spatial autocorrelation
does not “explain” anything. It only measures the amount and strength of
the spatial dependence. However, Conley and Topa (2003) suggest that us-
ing data in which location information is correct but imprecise (which is
typically the case when using postal codes or any administrative level) pre-
serves the identiﬁcation of parameters. In other words, if there are really
social interactions among criminals, involving spatial dependence at a more
macro-level, controlling for this spatial dependence keeps the model correct
even if it does not inform about the structure of local interactions per se.
To sum up, microeconomic theory suggests the existence of local inter-
actions among criminals but available data, which are collected at a more
macro-level, do not allow to measure and describe these interactions. On the
other side, crime data generally suggest the existence of spatial dependence
among crime rates. In order to know whether this dependence is due to a
true spatial process or only to a “noise” involved by the imprecision of data,
one needs to follow a speciﬁc procedure of testing and estimation.
63 Spatial autocorrelation of crime rates in Minas
Gerais
3.1 The data
Crime data used in this paper are issued from a database constructed
by the Fundação João Pinheiro and the Federal University of Minas Gerais
from police data. It contains, for 723 municipalities of Minas Gerais2, the
number of occurrences and the gross crime rate per 100.000 habitants. In
this paper, we distinguish violent crime against property from that against
persons. Violent crime against property is the sum of robbery and armed
robbery. Violent crime against persons is the sum of homicide, tentative of
homicide and assault. This decomposition enables us to test whether crime
against property and persons have the same determinants or, in other words,
to see if there is a violence or some violences.
Though it contains data from 1986 through 2002, we only use in this
paper a cross-section of the municipalities for the year 2000. This choice has
been conditioned by data availability: 2000 was the year of the last census in
Brazil, which provides the best economic and social data at municipal level.
During the census, about 25% of the population is surveyed, both at house-
hold and individual level. Moreover, it contains household and individual
weights, allowing to extend the results of the survey to the hole population.
Socio-economic variables used in this paper are issued from census data: we
aggregated weighted individual observations by municipality and then di-
2Minas Gerais now has 853 municipalities but the database was constructed while there
were only 723. Crime committed in new municipalities are thus added to the municipality
they formerly belonged to.
7vided it by the population, in order to get municipal averages (see summary
descriptive statistics in Table 3 of the Appendix).
Our crime database has the advantage to give data as disaggregated as
possible, municipality being the smallest administrative unit in Brazil. More-
over, though Minas Gerais is not the biggest nor the most inhabited state
of Brazil, it is the state with the most municipalities, a sign of the willing-
ness of decentralization of this state (and also a sign of the disaggregation
of our data). This database is, to the best of our knowledge, the only one of
that kind (i.e. to provide municipal-level crime data) for Brazil. However,
it suﬀers from the common weakness of all police-issued crime databases,
namely a measurement error. Police data records only reported crimes, not
all crimes committed in the area. As a consequence, oﬃcial crime rates un-
dermine real crime rates. Results presented here are thus to be interpreted
with caution.
3.2 Testing for spatial autocorrelation
The ﬁrst task when working in spatial econometrics is to deﬁne what
we consider as “neighbor” by constructing a spatial weight matrix. In this
paper, we follow most of the preceding works and consider contiguity (that
is two observations having a common border) as making neighborhood. We
then construct a binary contiguity matrix (“1” for neighbors, “0” else). By
construction, this matrix is squared and symmetric. In order to make easier
the interpretation of coeﬃcients, the matrix is row-standardized to one (the
sum of coeﬃcients for each line, i.e. each municipality, is ﬁxed at one).
Hence, the spatial lag of crime rate corresponds to the average crime rate of
8neighbors.
We ﬁrst take a look at spatial features of crime rates. Figures 1 and 2
display the Moran scatter plot for the logarithm of each crime rate used.
It shows, on the horizontal axis, values of crime rate for each municipality
and on the vertical axis the spatial lag, or in other words the neighbors’
mean crime rate and thus displays local spatial autocorrelation. The scatter
plot is centered on the mean so that the position of each point makes sense.
Points located in the lower left and the upper right quadrants suggest positive
spatial autocorrelation while upper left and lower rights quadrants suggest a
negative one. Moreover, the slope of the linear regression line is the Moran’s
I-statistic, which corresponds to the global spatial autocorrelation coeﬃcient
among all municipal crime rates.
Figures 1 and 2 show a general tendency to positive spatial autocorre-
lation among crime rates, which is conﬁrmed by the positive value of the
Moran’s I. This statistic suggests that roughly 20% of municipal crime rates
is correlated with neighbors’ crime rates. However, these ﬁgures also show
an extreme heterogeneity in the sample, which unfortunately weakens the
results.
We then run OLS regressions of crime rates and test for the presence of
spatial autocorrelation (Table 1, columns (1) and (2)). We follow Fajnzylber
et al. (2002) and consider income inequality, level of development and income
growth as the “core” determinants of crime. Since development and crime are
likely to be endogenous, we use the lagged value of the Human Development
Index (i.e. its value for 1991, year of the preceding census) as a measure
of development. We also introduce in the regression a set of usual control
9variables, well-known to be crime-enhancing: population density, the share of
female-headed households3, the share of male 15-24 years-old and an index
of racial polarization constructed following the methodology proposed by
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2003). Data are issued from the 2000 census
and from the Atlas of Human Development in Brazil4.
We present tests of Lagrange Multiplier for the presence of a spatial lag
(LMLAG) or spatial autocorrelation in the error term (LMERR) along with
their version robust to a local misspeciﬁcation of the model (i.e. presence
of a spatial lag when testing for autocorrelation in the error term and in-
versely), RLMLAG and RLMERR (see Anselin et al. 1996). We also present
the Moran test (which is diﬀerent from the Moran statistic showed in the
preceding ﬁgures) for the spatial autocorrelation of the residuals of the OLS
regression. These tests suggest the presence of spatial autocorrelation for
both crime rate and the error term, the former being more signiﬁcant than
the latter. However, these tests can also be interpreted as speciﬁcation tests,
particularly if there are omitted variables (see Le Gallo 2000). A possible
misspeciﬁcation, since we work upon local correlation among crime rates,
is to forget a possible regional eﬀect. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1 dis-
play the same OLS regressions as in column (1) and (2) respectively, with
the introduction of a meso-region ﬁxed eﬀect (there are 12 meso-regions in
Minas Gerais). The only test to be always signiﬁcant is the robust test for
the presence of a spatial lag (RLMLAG). Moreover, tests for the presence
3Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999) found that crime are higher in cities partly because of
their higher share of female-headed households, which is actually a sign of the weakness
of social links and social capital.
4Atlas do Desenvolvimento Humano no Brasil, UNDP (2003), freely available to down-
load at www.undp.org.br
10of autocorrelation in the error term are always less signiﬁcant than these
for the presence of spatial dependence in the variable. All of this suggests
that OLS estimates are likely to be biased and that spatial autocorrelation
requires a speciﬁc econometric treatment.
4 A spatial econometric model of crime
The model to be estimated is then the following:
y = ρ.Wy + Xβ + ǫ (1)
where X is the matrix of independent variables, β the associated vector of
coeﬃcients, W the spatial weights matrix, ρ the spatial autocorrelation coef-
ﬁcient and ǫ the error term. In this paper, W is a so-called row-standardized
contiguity matrix. In other words, ρ is the coeﬃcient associated with the
eﬀect of the average crime rate of neighbor municipalities upon the crime
rate of each municipality. This model cannot be estimated by OLS since
spatial autocorrelation biases the estimator, and requires Maximum Likeli-
hood (ML) estimates5. Results are presented in Table 2, following the same
scheme as in Table 1: the ﬁrst two columns present results for estimates with-
out meso-region ﬁxed eﬀects while the last two columns display results with
regional ﬁxed eﬀects. For each regression, Table 2 displays three usual spec-
iﬁcation tests for the signiﬁcance of spatial autocorrelation. Though these
three tests are asymptotically convergent, they are all displayed in Table 2
because the spatial estimator is not identical to the other ML estimators (see
5See Anselin (2001) for a discussion on the OLS bias and on the spatial Maximum
Likelihood estimator.
11Anselin 2001) and hence has not the same properties.
Comparing results with and without ﬁxed eﬀects gives some information
concerning the amount and structure of the dependence between municipal
crime rates. As the Moran’s I-statistic suggested it in the preceding section,
columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 display a positive autocorrelation among crime
rates of about 0.2-0.3, this correlation being strongly signiﬁcant. However,
the spatial feature of crime seems to depend on the type of crime considered.
Columns (1) and (3) suggest a large spatial diﬀusion of property crime:
even after clustering municipalities by meso-region, spatial dependence is
still high (roughly 0.17) and signiﬁcant. In other words, total autocorrelation
(0.263) can be decomposed between a correlation within each meso-region
(of about 0.10) and the remaining global spatial dependence. Following the
classiﬁcation proposed by Cohen and Tita (1999), it suggests a hierarchical
diﬀusion of violent crime against property, which does not requires any direct
contact between criminals.
On the opposite, violent crime against persons appears to be a much
more localized phenomenon. Columns (2) and (4) of Table 2 show that,
after introducing a regional ﬁxed eﬀect, spatial autocorrelation is small and
no longer signiﬁcant. Spatial correlation among interpersonal violence rates
(of about 0.20) is thus almost due to correlation within meso-regions. In
other words, it suggests a process of “clustering” around big crime centers
like Belo Horizonte, the capital, or the other big cities of the state, places
located faraway from these centers not being “infected”. Hence, this kind of
crime seems to follow a process of contagious diﬀusion, involved by proximity
and direct contact between criminals. It should be interpreted, not like a
12“learning by seeing” process, but rather like a sign of a strong violence inertia,
which is conform to the ﬁndings of Sah (1991).
These two results are consistent with some preceding works. Glaeser
et al. (1996) found a signiﬁcant impact of social interactions upon property
crime (particularly “small” crime like robbery and theft, which corresponds
to crime studied in this paper) but not upon serious crime (homicide, rape).
Even if we do not work with micro-data and are thus unable to state anything
about the impact and amount of social interactions, our results suggest that
property crime spreads much more than interpersonal violence, underlying
a bigger role of interactions between criminals for the former than for the
latter. Moreover, most of preceding works dealing with spatial diﬀusion of
homicide (e.g. Cohen and Tita 1999, Messner et al. 1999, Baller et al. 2001,
Messner and Anselin forthcoming) also found a contagious-type diﬀusion and
clustering for that kind of crime.
5 Concluding remarks and policy implications
The aim of this paper was to investigate the existence of a spatial de-
pendence of crime rates at local level. We explored if and how crime rates
are correlated using a cross-section of 723 municipalities of Minas Gerais, a
Brazilian state, for 2000. Results suggests a signiﬁcantly positive spatial au-
tocorrelation among crime rates. However, property crime and interpersonal
violence do not follow the same scheme. Property crime spreads much more
than crime against persons, which itself appears, as a consequence, to be a
localized and concentrated phenomenon.
13These spatial features of crime should deserve a particular attention from
policy-makers. First, in order to limit diﬀusion of property crime, anti-crime
policies (repression but also social policies like employment or housing pro-
grams) should concern suburbs as well as crime centers. Fighting crime only
in centers do not prevent diﬀusion of violent crime against property, which
does not need direct contact between criminals to spread. If we consider that
property crime in hot spots cannot be eradicated totally, priority should even
be given to limit its diﬀusion and hence to ﬁght crime in peripheries. Second,
anti-crime policies should also take into account the fact that property crime
and interpersonal violence do not share the same spatial features and thus
require a speciﬁc treatment. Since violent crime against persons seems to
not naturally spread so much, eﬀorts should be concentrated to reduce it in
high-violence places (essentially poor neighborhoods of cities), all the more
if we consider, like our results suggest it, that “pure” violence experiments a
strong inertia.
However, it is impossible, as long as data are aggregated, to determine
the sources of this inertia, as well as the sources of spatial diﬀusion of crime in
general. There is a real need for micro-level data of crime, in order to really
estimate the link between social interactions and crime. Moreover, it would
be useful to have more data, particularly for the other Brazilian states. Since
criminals do not stop at municipal borders, there are no reasons to assume
that they limit their activities to only one state, particularly in the high-
crime Southeastern region of Brazil (states of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo,
Minas Gerais and Espirito Santo). Such a mapping of crime activities would
be particularly useful for security and social policies.
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Figure 1: Moran scatter plot for logarithm of violent crime against property


































Figure 2: Moran scatter plot for logarithm of violent crime against persons
20Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Crime against property (/100,000) 723 49.207 94.920 0.000 1118.805
Crime against persons (/100,000) 723 41.152 36.657 0.000 349.284
Violent crime (/100,000) 723 90.282 108.961 0.000 1244.501
HDI 1991 723 0.644 0.058 0.483 0.791
Gini coeﬃcient 723 0.688 0.090 0.500 0.841
Income growth 723 0.512 0.266 -0.330 1.972
Population density 723 57.319 289.88 1.430 6744.580
Female-headed households 723 5.298 1.701 1.980 15.440
Male 15-24 years old 723 0.099 0.009 0.068 0.135
Racial polarization 723 0.779 0.166 0.053 0.980
21Table 2: OLS regressions of violent crime rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Violent crime Violent crime Violent crime Violent crime
against against against against
Property Persons Property Persons
HDI 1991 13.802 -2.964 14.046 -1.082
(11.00) (2.53) (8.78) (0.72)
Income Gini 4.485 3.845 4.137 3.671
(6.41) (5.88) (5.79) (5.49)
Income growth -0.146 -0.091 0.039 0.046
(0.68) (0.46) (0.17) (0.22)
Population density 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.95) (1.46) (1.81) (1.40)
Female-headed households 0.002 0.046 0.005 0.047
(0.07) (1.36) (0.13) (1.36)
Male 15-24 years-old 35.776 28.199 31.471 26.082
(4.96) (4.19) (4.28) (3.79)
Racial polarization 1.011 1.597 0.935 0.408
(2.67) (4.51) (1.98) (0.92)
Intercept -13.485 -1.915 -12.253 -1.344
(10.64) (1.62) (8.72) (1.02)
Meso-region ﬁxed eﬀect No No Yes Yes
Observations 723 723 723 723
R-squared 0.31 0.19 0.36 0.25
Moran’s I 4.523 2.489 2.986 0.452
(p-values) (0.000) (0.013) (0.003) (0.651)
LMLAG 33.225 14.556 11.241 0.699
(p-values) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.403)
RLMLAG 17.405 25.633 8.796 16.830
(p-values) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
LMERR 18.246 5.115 4.843 0.063
(p-values) (0.000) (0.024) (0.028) (0.802)
RLMERR 2.426 16.191 2.397 16.194
(p-values) (0.119) (0.000) (0.122) (0.000)
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
Crime rates are expressed in logarithms.
22Table 3: Spatial regressions of violent crime rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Violent crime Violent crime Violent crime Violent crime
against against against against
Property Persons Property Persons
HDI 1991 11.736 -2.139 13.011 -0.978
(9.25) (1.83) (8.17) (0.66)
Gini coeﬃcient 4.598 3.668 4.224 3.643
(6.79) (5.71) (6.04) (5.52)
Income growth -0.044 -0.052 0.081 0.046
(0.21) (0.26) (0.37) (0.22)
Population density 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.38) (1.19) (1.44) (1.34)
Female-headed households 0.020 0.042 0.013 0.046
(0.55) (1.24) (0.36) (1.34)
Male 15-24 years-old 32.487 24.856 29.990 25.432
(4.64) (3.73) (4.17) (3.73)
Racial polarization 0.764 1.302 0.818 0.398
(2.07) (3.66) (1.76) (0.91)
Intercept -12.622 -2.399 -12.112 -1.516
(10.21) (2.05) (8.82) (1.16)
Meso-region ﬁxed eﬀect No No Yes Yes
rho (spatial correlation) 0.263 0.204 0.168 0.051
(5.62) (3.81) (3.33) (0.86)
Observations 723 723 723 723
Log likelihood -1297.052 -1255.378 -1278.154 -1234.439
Wald test of rho = 0 31.549 14.499 11.077 0.733
(p-values) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.392)
LR test of rho = 0 29.716 13.924 10.769 0.729
(p-values) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.393)
LM test of rho = 0 33.225 14.556 11.241 0.699
(p-values) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.403)
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
Crime rates are expressed in logarithms.
23